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tance of the null hypothesis. One can always argue that the test
of awareness was insensitive, did not match the conditions
present at encoding, or was unreliable. Caution is appropriate in
calling subjects unaware, but one must ask how an experimenter
can be any more certain that subjects do not have explicit
knowledge when subjects repeatedly deny noticing a sequence,
make errors when forced to guess about its characteristics, and
fail to recognize it (Willingham et al. 1993).
Even if unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily dem-
onstrated, consciousness may still be an important attribute in
CSs of memory. S&S take the position that consciousness can
only take on two values (conscious or unconscious) as an attri-
bute in a CS. A complete lack of awareness may be one end of a
spectrum of states of awareness of the contingency at learning; if
unconscious learning cannot take place, that does not mean that
the rest of the spectrum is irrelevant.
In sum, the implicit/explicit CS appears preferable to the
fragment-based/rule-based CS because: (1) the latter is discor-
dant with the amnesic data, whereas the former fits those data
and shows that two different theoretical principles - information
processing and neurobiology - lead to the same CS; and (2) the
chief argument against the implicit/explicit CS (that learning is
never unconscious) is difficult to falsify, because one who be-
lieves the testing of awareness was not adequate can raise
objections that cannot be discounted. Furthermore, if uncon-
scious learning did not exist, it would not sound a death knell for
the implicit/explicit CS. For this CS to have validity, there need
only be variability in the attribute of consciousness, and predic-
tive power in that variability.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT-
The author thanks Maggie Keane for very helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this commentary.
Authors' Response
How should implicit learning be
characterized?
David R. Shanks
3 and Mark F. St. John
b
"Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E
6BT, England; "Department of Cognitive Science, University of California at
San Diego, La Mia, CA 92093
Electronic mall: odavid.shanks@psychol.ucl.ac.uk;
bmstjohn@cogsci.ucsd.edu;
The commentators on our target article have raised a very
broad range of issues, and in our response we will attempt
to answer as many of the key points as possible. We thank
the commentators for the careful consideration they have
given to our arguments. We should say at the outset,
however, that although our arguments have been chal-
lenged at a number of places, we have not been led to
abandon our view of the implicit learning literature. We
continue to believe that although the instance/rule dis-
tinction provides a meaningful characterization of human
learning, it remains highly questionable whether uncon-
scious learning has been adequately demonstrated.
The organization of our response is shown in Table Rl.
Our plan is first to say something about the appeal of
implicit learning, and then to consider the question of
unconscious learning: whether our Information and Sen-
sitivity Criteria are appropriate, how consciousness and
learning should be defined, what the role of conscious-
ness in learning might be, and whether the further
evidence for unconscious learning that commentators
discuss warrants a revision of our conclusions. Following
these sections, we will consider other dimensions for
characterizing distinct learning systems. Is the frag-
ment/instance memorization versus rule-induction dis-
tinction a useful and valid one? And finally, can we refine
and further specify what is learned and later used by the
fragment/instance system?
R1. The appeal of implicit learning
Carlson points out that the idea of implicit learning has an
appeal that defies dismissal. Part of this appeal might
simply be the cachet of a mysterious process. But more
seriously, there clearly is something to implicit learning.
Most, if not all, of the commentators agree that there is a
real phenomenon, one characterized by Holyoak &
Cattis as "(a) knowledge about covariations in the environ-
ment, (b) learned by exposure to stimuli exhibiting the
covariations . . . (e) [knowledge that] is not fully verbaliz-
able and (/) [knowledge that] is not manipulable in the
sense that it cannot be re-represented explicitly to serve
as input to other procedures." We agree; the task at hand
is to further analyze this phenomenon. One question is
whether the implicit learning process and the resulting
information are unconscious. The other question con-
cerns what this knowledge is like and what sort of learning
process acquires it.
Several commentators (Berry, Lindsay & Corayska,
Reber & Winter) have challenged an important aspect of
the overall logic of the target article. We have assumed
that the sensible approach is to be skeptical about uncon-
scious learning until it is demonstrated, but these com-
mentators argue that exactly the opposite assumption
should be adopted, namely, that unconscious processes
have some sort of priority over conscious ones. For exam-
ple, Berry says that we "adopt the position that unless
researchers can prove conclusively that learning is uncon-
scious then we should assume that it is conscious," but we
"never justify why conscious processing should be the
default assumption." Our argument is simply that explicit
learning is the agreed starting point, since no one doubts
that learning is at least some of the time accompanied by
awareness of what is being learned. What remains to be
shown is whether unconscious learning is also feasible.
The position advocated by Berry, Lindsay & Gorayska,
and Reber & Winter is tantamount to holding that uncon-
scious learning does not need to be demonstrated in the
laboratory. But no amount of a priori argumentation is
going to demonstrate its existence: what is needed is clear
experimental evidence. If we do not know in a certain task
whether knowledge is conscious or unconscious, it is
surely foolhardy to assume the latter.
R2. Criteria for establishing unconscious
learning
Before discussing potential problems with our conceptu-
alization of implicit and explicit learning, we would like to
mention briefly a very interesting article published after
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1994) 17:3 427Response/'Shanks & St. John: Dissociable learning systems
Table Rl. Organization of the authors' response to specific commentaries
Topics Commentators
Rl. The appeal of implicit learning
R2. Criteria for establishing unconscious learning
R2.1. The Sensitivity and Information Criteria
R2.2. Defining consciousness and learning
R2.3. Measuring consciousness
R2.4. Defining explicit learning and consciousness
by verbal report
R2.5. Do prediction and recognition tasks measure
conscious or unconscious knowledge?
R2.6. The possible causal role of awareness
R3. Further evidence for implicit learning
R3.1. The mere exposure effect
R3.2. Conditioning
R3.3. Instrumental learning
R3.4. Sequence learning
R3.5. Amnesia
R3.6. Language learning
R4. How should implicit learning be characterized?
R4.1. Consciousness and models of implicit learn-
ing
R4.2. The fragment/instance memorizer
R4.3. The relationship between memorization and
rule induction
Berry, Carlson, Holyoak & Gattis, Lindsay & Gorayska, Re-
ber & Winter
Berry, Brody & Crowley, Carlson, Catania, Dienes & Per-
ner, Holyoak & Gattis, Lindsay & Gorayska, Merikle, Over-
skeid, Perruchet & Gallego, Rakover, Reed & Johnson,
Stadler & Frensch, Svartdal
Baeyens et al., Catania, Howe & Rabinowitz, Overskeid,
Packard
Andrade, Baeyens et al., Catania, Dienes & Perner, Ennen,
Nagata, Overskeid, Reber & Winter, Stadler & Frensch,
Squire et al., Terrace
Catania, Cleeremans, Dienes & Perner, Lindsay & Gorayska,
Merikle, Overskeid, Rakover, Terrace, Willingham
Cleeremans, Dienes & Perner, Rakover, Seger
Catania, Poldrack & Cohen, Squire et al., Svartdal
Overskeid
Bornstein, Brody & Crowley
Baeyens et al., Kimmel
Andrade, Berry, Overskeid, Rizzo & Parlangeli, Svartdal
Cleeremans, Reed & Johnson, Stadler & Frensch
Cleeremans, Holyoak & Gattis, Kourtzi et al., Packard, Pol-
drack & Cohen, Reber & Winter, Seger, Squire et al.,
Willingham
Goldstone & Kruschke, Lachter, Nagata, Reber & Winter
Holyoak & Gattis, Kourtzi et al., Merikle, Nagata
Cleeremans
Cleeremans, Kimmel, Marsolek, Perruchet & Gallego, Seger
Goldstone & Kruschke, Howe & Rabinowitz, Nagata, Pack-
ard, Poldrack & Cohen, Reber & Winter
the target article was completed and which, we believe,
provides overwhelming justification for our strict criteria.
Farah et al. (1993) were interested in the relationship
between implicit (or "covert") and explicit ("overt") pro-
cessing in prosopagnosics, patients who, as a result of
brain damage, have difficulty recognizing faces. The typi-
cal pattern of findings is that whereas prosopagnosics may
not be able to name a familiar, visually presented face,
they will nevertheless process that face faster than an
unfamiliar face during the course of a task, thus suggest-
ing that some face knowledge is preserved. For example,
less time is taken to judge a pair of familiar faces the same
than to judge a pair of unfamiliar ones the same. Just
as with implicit learning, the suggestion is that the
person may have knowledge that is not available to con-
sciousness.
Farah et al., however, have provided compelling evi-
dence that the dissociation between implicit and explicit
processing in prosopagnosia is attributable to differential
test sensitivity. They constructed a parallel distributed
processing model which could be presented with coded
representations of faces. Two aspects of the network's
performance were monitored: overt recognition and
speed of processing. When Farah et al. lesioned their
network, they were able to reproduce all of the major
dissociations of implicit and explicit performance seen in
prosopagnosics, but these dissociations came from a sys-
tem that has a single (albeit distributed) knowledge
source. Thus it follows that the dissociations must have
arisen because the implicit tests were better able than the
explicit ones to detect small amounts of residual knowl-
edge in the system. [See also Farah: "Neuropsychological
Inference with an Interactive Brain: A Critique of the
'Locality' Assumption" BBS 17(1) 1994.]
This conclusion is, of course, exactly parallel to our
argument that many examples of apparent implicit learn-
ing can be explained by the fact that the explicit test does
not meet our Sensitivity Criterion. Below, we describe
some analogous simulations we have conducted of im-
plicit learning in amnesia.
R2.1. The Sensitivity and Information Criteria. Several
commentators endorsed the Sensitivity and Information
Criteria (Berry, Brody & Crowley, Carlson, Perruchet &
Gallego, Reed & Johnson, Svartdal), whereas others
raised concerns over them. Dienes & Perner, Holyoak &
Gattis, Lindsay & Gorayska, and Overskeid all argue that
our criteria are too stringent and make it very difficult, in
principle, to dissociate learning and awareness. Dienes
and Perner, for example, propose a thought-experiment
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in which a subject has instance-based, but unconscious,
knowledge of a grammar; they argue that if the perfor-
mance and awareness tests are made sufficiently similar to
meet our criteria then it is very difficult to imagine a
mechanism that would apply the knowledge in one case
but not in the other.
We have two responses to this. The first is that there are
many people who believe that there are studies that meet
these conditions, in which one test does reveal knowledge
whereas another very similar one does not (see commen-
taries by Reed & Johnson, Stadler & Frensch). The
second is that if the criteria are relaxed, then although the
likelihood of observing dissociations between our two
tasks increases, so does the danger that the dissociation is
due to differential sensitivity or a mismatch in the type of
information examined by the two tests. We believe that if
it is difficult to demonstrate unconscious learning, that is
all the more reason to be cautious about its existence.
Catania, Holyoak & Cattis, and Lindsay & Corayska
go further and argue that we have effectively equated
learning and awareness, with the consequence that we
have (in Catania's words) "designed a set of conditions
such that learning cannot occur without awareness." But
this represents a gross misunderstanding of our position.
We have suggested that there are two types of measures.
Some, (conditioned responses, sequential reaction times,
grammaticality judgments) provide indices of learning.
Others (recognition, prediction, verbal reports) may pro-
vide useful evidence concerning the content of conscious-
ness. Although it would be very controversial to claim that
the learning tests provide pure (or even partial) assess-
ments of awareness, we have shown that when the results
of these two sorts of tests are compared, it turns out as a
plain empirical fact that learning and awareness are typ-
ically associated.
Merikle elaborates some of the issues raised in the
target article concerning the logic of single dissociations,
arguing strongly that this logic will always founder on the
impossibility of demonstrating beyond doubt that a given
test of awareness is exhaustive. We are probably not quite
as skeptical as Merikle about the possibility of establishing
unconscious learning in experiments using the single
dissociation logic, but we agree wholeheartedly that his
concerns should be addressed more adequately by de-
fenders of implicit learning. Merikle, Perruchet & Gal-
lego, and Svartdal all advocate the exploration of alterna-
tive strategies, an idea we fully support.
Perruchet & Callego and Brody & Crowley raise the
very interesting but thorny issue of learning during the
test. Perruchet & Gallego refer, for example, to evidence
that above-chance performance in a grammaticality judg-
ment test may be due to learning taking place in the test
rather than to the retrieval of information from an earlier
study phase. As evidence of this, Perruchet (1994) reports
performance significantly above chance in subjects not
given a study phase. A related effect, noted in the target
article, is that subjects may observe their performance
during testing and thereby become aware of their implicit
knowledge. These possibilities are worrisome, because
they challenge the idea that tests (either implicit or
explicit) may reveal whether prior learning was conscious
or unconscious. Rather than providing evidence about'
earlier processing, performance on the test is under the
control of events happening during the test itself. We fully
agree with Perruchet & Gallego and Brody & Crowley
that this is a real possibility that requires much further
investigation.
Rakover offers an entirely new method of determining
whether a task can be learned without awareness, but we
believe his procedure is flawed. He proposes that a task is
"not susceptible to introspective awareness" if the sub-
ject, having been told the rule governing the task but not
the specific content of the rule, is unable to discover even
a part of the content of the rule. As an example, he cites
data reported in the Lewicki et al. (1987) study, which was
extensively discussed in the target article. In a pilot study,
Lewicki et al. informed subjects that there were rules
governing the position of the target on complex trials and
offered them $100 for finding any parts of the rules. None
was able to do so, from which Rakover concludes that the
task is not susceptible to introspective awareness. He
then suggests that if such an unsusceptible task is learn-
able, it follows that the learning must be unconscious.
Because Lewicki et al. obtained reaction time (RT) speed-
up when subjects were exposed to the RT version of the
task, Rakover's analysis suggests that learning was uncon-
scious. The structure of the task could not be determined
by conscious analysis but could be learned implicitly.
The problem with such an account, however, is that it is
left up to experimenters to specify in the susceptibility
test the "rule" they think is relevant. But if this rule is not
what is responsible for learning in the later performance
test, the experimenter will erroneously conclude that
learning was unconscious when it may well have been
conscious. As we argued, the RT speed-up in Lewicki et
al.'s experiments was almost certainly not due to knowl-
edge of the rules that were required in the susceptibility
test. In sum, Rakover's account falls foul of the conse-
quences of not adopting the Information Criterion.
None of the commentators seems to question the status
of the Information Criterion. We all appear to be in
agreement that the test of awareness must focus on the
same information that underlies successful task perfor-
mance. One point made by Carlson, which we readily
accept, is that it is not merely stimulus-specific informa-
tion that is relevant but also self-specific information
about such things as intentions. All of the information that
plays a role in task performance - including such things as
goals and intentions — must be known before we can judge
whether an awareness test meets the criterion.
R2.2. Defining consciousness and learning. Several com-
mentators (Baeyens et al., Catania, Overskeid, Packard)
wondered why we had failed to define learning and
awareness, but we regard doing so as a futile exercise.
Surely the past thirty years of research on human concept
learning should have taught us that some concepts are
simply ill defined and fuzzy? And surely everybody real-
ises that any definitions of these terms we offer would
immediately be challenged? Readers of Dennett (1991)
will search the book in vain for a "definition" of conscious-
ness, but just because a concept cannot be given an
analytic definition, does not mean it is outside the scope of
scientific investigation. [See also Dennett & Kinsbburne:
"Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Con-
sciousness in the Brain" BBS 15(2)1992.]
With respect to learning, Roediger (1993) offers a clear
illustration of the difficulty in finding a suitable definition.
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He reports that the average duration of labor in giving
birth to first-born babies is 9.5 hours, whereas with later-
born babies it is 6.6 hours. Clearly, with second and third
children the amount of time the mother spends in labor is
much less than with first children. Does this mean that
something has been learned which explains the speed up?
On the one hand, it could be argued that if repetition
priming is an example of learning (as indexed, say, by
latency of tachistoscopic identification), then so should
this "priming" effect in childbirth. On the other hand, it
seems strange to say that the female reproductive system
is capable of "learning" and "remembering." We suggest
that borderline cases such as this and the ones cited by
Overskeid (e.g., the immune system "learning" to recog-
nise viruses) illustrate the futility of trying to define
learning.
Baeyens et al. claim we are arguing that "any verbal or
nonverbal behavior which might reasonably be thought of
as reflecting a judgment based on a belief-that-x should be
treated as an index of awareness-of-x," but we certainly
never argue for this in the target article. Apart from
anything else, such a definition would probably make
unconscious learning a logical impossibility. Our ap-
proach is wholly pragmatic - we offer no hard and fast
criteria as to what counts as a test of awareness. However,
we do believe that if a subject has an expectancy of a future
event and is able to project that expectancy into a truly
instrumental action (as opposed to a reflex), then the
expectancy is almost certainly conscious. At present, it is
fair to say that we do not know for certain whether
responses in a prediction task are instrumental acts or
reflexes (see Dickinson 1988 and Jacoby et al. 1993, for
possible ways of distinguishing between these). We dis-
cuss the prediction task further in section R2.5. In fact,
we are largely in agreement with Baeyens et al.'s criteria
for what counts as consciousness. Our only dispute would
be that it is a truism that "awareness-of-x is the pres-
ence . . . of a phenomenal state of having-the-subjective-
impression-to-consciously-know-that-x."
Howe & Rabinowitz take us to task for being unspecific
as to what it is that the subject needs to be aware (or
unaware) of. They point out that there are three ways in
which consciousness may be related to learning: "the
organism as conscious while learning, the organism as
being conscious of learning, and the organism being
conscious of what is being learned." We thought we had
been clear about this, but to reiterate, the question is
whether or not the subject is aware of the information that
is responsible for improved performance on the implicit
test (i.e., the third case above). Whether an organism is
aware in the general sense, or whether it is aware that it is
learning, is simply irrelevant to the issue of implicit
learning.
R2.3. Measuring consciousness. In their thoughtful com-
mentary, Dienes & Perner suggest that performance on,
for example, a prediction test measures the objective
rather than the subjective threshold of awareness. Sub-
jects may perform above chance on such a test despite
believing that they are guessing, in which case their
knowledge should be described as unconscious, and by
inference, their learning should be described as uncon-
scious as well.
We have two points to make about this. First, in the
sorts of studies reviewed in the target article, we do not
know whether this is what subjects believe - they may
well believe that their prediction performance is above
chance (though the unpublished study Dienes & Perner
cite, in which subjects reported that they were guessing,
sounds very promising). Second, and more important, the
problem with the subjective/objective threshold distinc-
tion is the way in which the subjective threshold is
assessed. Subjects are notoriously poor at knowing what
randomness is, so when asked whether or not they be-
lieve they are guessing, there is no reason to suppose that
a veridical answer concerning their state of awareness is
given. Moreover, the subjective threshold is often as-
sessed post hoc: at the end of a block of trials, subjects are
asked to evaluate their performance across that block. It
would hardly be surprising in the circumstances that very
ephemeral states of consciousness during the prediction
trials might be forgotten or discounted by the time of the
evaluation. The subjective threshold technique may yield
results different from the objective one only because the
testing conditions are different and the subjective test is
less sensitive. (This is much less of a problem in blind-
sight, of course, because the subjective judgment about
performance is made in the presence of the stimulus to
which the subject is responding. We certainly would not
want to dispute the importance of the subjective/
objective difference in such cases as blindsight).
In citing a test which they construe as measuring
unconscious learning but which we view as measuring
conscious knowledge, Baeyens et al. attempt to point out
the unacceptability of our methods of assessing aware-
ness. In the evaluative conditioning study they cite,
subjects were exposed in the learning phase to a relation-
ship between line thickness in a geometrical figure and
the valence of a subsequently presented picture (positive
or negative). In the critical test, subjects saw a geometri-
cal figure and were told that a positive or negative picture
would be presented subliminally immediately after it.
Subjects had to say whether they thought they had seen a
positive or negative picture, even though none was actu-
ally presented. Subjects performed above chance on this
test: they reported seeing a positive slide, for example, if
the geometrical figure had been paired in the study phase
with a positive slide.
Baeyens et al. want to offer this as a test of unconscious
knowledge, but we see no strong evidence supporting
that position. It is equally possible that the subjects, as a
result of the study phase, have a (very fragile) conscious
expectancy of a picture of a certain valence given a certain
geometrical figure. Their expectancy may then bias the
response they give, such that this forced-choice test can
be interpreted as assessing awareness. We believe the
burden of proof is on those who support the idea of
unconscious influences to demonstrate that their inter-
pretation is the only viable one. In this case, we suggest it
is not.
In support of unconscious processes in general, Over-
skeid claims there is much evidence that our decisions
may often be taken by our brains prior to any conscious
intention to act, and that we "jump on a running train
believing we started it." As evidence, he cites the well-
known experiments of Libet (1985), but these have been
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subjected to so much criticism (see Dennett 1991) that it
is highly premature to treat them as conclusive.
A number of commentators (Overskeid, Reber & Win-
ter, Squire et al., Terrace) draw strong inferences from
the fact that learning can occur in preverbal children and
in lowly organisms such as the invertebrate Aplysia. The
argument is that we are on the horns of a dilemma: either
our thesis forces us to conclude that such organisms are
conscious, or, if it is assumed that such organisms cannot
possibly be conscious, then the forms of learning they are
capable of must be unconscious. We believe that neither
of these arguments is valid. First, just because a regu-
larity occurs in humans does not mean it holds for other
species. No amount of argumentation from animal experi-
ments is going to alter the fact that a correlation between
awareness and learning exists in humans.
Second, it cannot simply be asserted that nonhuman
organisms are unconscious (see Dennett 1991; Griffin
1992, Nagel 1974). In fact, we believe that little produc-
tive purpose is to be gained in discussing animal con-
sciousness at all, since there is no agreed-upon means of
deciding what counts as consciousness in animals, and our
intuitions clearly differ from those of some commentators.
Reber & Winter are confident that animals are uncon-
scious, but they provide no reasons for their view. Sim-
ilarly, after describing evidence of learning in two- to
three-month-old infants, Terrace states (correctly, in our
view) that "whether infants are aware of their expectations
is entirely a matter of speculation," but then goes on to
conclude that "since consciousness in infants cannot be
subjected to empirical study, there is no basis for assum-
ing that infants are conscious of what they learn." But
equally, there is no basis for assuming that they are not
conscious. Terrace gives no rationale for his belief that
there is "compelling evidence of learning without con-
sciousness in infants and animals." To repeat, we doubt
that the matter is decidable, and in any case it has little
bearing on our conclusions. The target article, and the
experiments it reviewed, are about adult human learning.
Catania proposes a number of animal experiments
analogous to human implicit learning ones (see McLaren
et al., in press, for similar examples) to illustrate his belief
that it is only verbal reports, and not other forms of
behavior such as recognition or prediction, that are of
relevance to the concept of consciousness. [See also
Lubinski & Thompson: "Species and Individual Differ-
ences in Communication Based on Private States" BBS
16(4)1993.] For example, in a pigeon analogue of a se-
quential RT experiment, it would be possible to set up
both an RT measure and a prediction measure. Catania
suggests that if the pigeon's RT and prediction responses
correlated, such that RT improvements never occurred in
the absence of above-chance prediction responses, our
position would force us to conclude that the pigeon is
aware.
We went to some lengths to acknowledge that predic-
tion responses might be susceptible to unconscious influ-
ences (see below), so the conclusion that the pigeon is
conscious would not necessarily follow. But our main
response to Catania is to turn his question around: What
would he conclude from his pigeon experiment if the RT
and prediction measures dissociated? Would one not have
to conclude that there is a source of information that is
available to one response but not the other, and (if the
tasks are very similar) that what characterizes this infor-
mation is that it is unconscious? Surely, on his reasoning,
this would be even stronger evidence for conscious pro-
cesses (in the control of prediction responses) in nonver-
bal organisms. Of course, we doubt that such dissocia-
tions occur in humans so there is little reason to anticipate
them in other organisms, but that is no reason to believe
that consciousness is a logical impossibility in animals.
Ennen recalls the Rylean distinction drawn between
"learning-how" and "learning-that." She argues that
learning-how does not involve acquiring information so it
cannot be reported. Therefore, it must be learned implic-
itly. Unfortunately, although her argument seems sound,
(that is, although unconscious learning appears to be a
sound logical possibility), there does not appear to be any
clear evidence for it. Take conditioning, for example. This
is a perfect example of knowing-how, a form of learning
that can be characterized as "the incremental modifica-
tion of perceptual-motor connections over time such that
the agent acquires a neurophysiological disposition for
improved performance." Yet in humans, conditioning is
always accompanied by awareness. Thus Ennen's analysis
does nothing to challenge the claim that learning is always
accompanied by consciousness.
Stadler & Frensch and Nagata suggest that learning is
implicit when it is unaffected by intention. It is quite
reasonable to define theoretical terms as one wants, but
this creates an entity different from the "implicit" learning
that is the focus of the target article, because intention is
synonymous neither with awareness nor with abstraction.
These commentators are surely right that learning can be
either intentional or unintentional, but to focus on the
learning process rather than the learned information is
simply to change the subject. Remember that the thesis
we are assessing proposes that information can exist in
such a form as to be able to project itself onto behavior
without being represented in consciousness. This is a
thesis about information, not process.
Andrade points to a motivational issue in measuring
awareness among patients under general anesthesia. She
discusses the isolated forearm technique which reveals
high levels of awareness in anesthetized people, but, as
she notes, even this test is fallible, because of motiva-
tional changes in subjects. Not only is it the case, as we
argued in the target article, that evidence for learning and
memory during anesthesia is contradictory (see Merikle
& Rondi, 1993, for an even more skeptical review), it is
also doubtful that anesthetized subjects are always uncon-
scious of events happening around them.
R2.4. Defining explicit learning and consciousness by
verbal report. Some commentators (Catania, Dienes &
Perner, Lindsay & Gorayska, Overskeid, Rakover, Ter-
race) suggest that verbal report is the best place to draw
the line between explicit and implicit learning. Lindsay &
Gorayska argue that it may be more difficult than we
assumed to prove that another test is more sensitive or
exhaustive than is verbal report, and therefore only the
latter should be adopted as an index of consciousness. But
not only does this immediately rule out animals and
nonlinguistic humans as being conscious, it also makes
unconscious learning a logical necessity. Whereas we are
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accused of making unconscious learning a logical impos-
sibility, Lindsay & Gorayska appear to be doing the exact
opposite! We agree with Merikle that establishing a test as
exhaustive is likely to prove very difficult, and we doubt
that Lindsay & Gorayska have any case for establishing
this with respect to verbal report.
The view that there is something special about verbal
reports appears frequently in the commentaries, but we
see no basis for adopting this strong position. There is no
clear boundary between reports and other tests of aware-
ness; instead, we take verbal reports to be merely one of
several means of assessing awareness. For example, Mar-
cel (1993) has shown that subjects can be much better at
using responses other than verbal reports as indicators of
awareness. Marcel presented subjects with a brief light
close to the threshold of detection and instructed them to
report on each trial whether they saw the light by blink-
ing, pressing a button, and saying "yes." Subjects on the
same trial reported with their finger that they saw the
light while reporting orally that they did not, and vice
versa. Most interestingly, verbal reports did not turn out
to be the most sensitive index on detection: blinking,
under some conditions, was far more sensitive. In the face
of such findings, it is very difficult to assign a special role
to verbal reports.
Other commentators point out that there is a qualita-
tive difference between learning in subjects who can
retrospectively report and justify their performance and
subjects who deny having any knowledge of their perfor-
mance. However, both the Sensitivity and Information
Criteria suggest that verbal recall is a poor place to draw a
line between learning systems. Reportable knowledge
varies between subjects, their vocabularies, the retrieval
cues available, prompting, set, certainty of the knowl-
edge, and so on. We see little justification for a qualitative
difference at the point of spontaneous or prompted verbal
recall. We do see the level of verbal report as an interest-
ing and legitimate independent variable, but one with
quantitative rather than qualitative levels. And we agree
with Willingham that quantitative differences make for
poor taxonomies.
Two commentators (Cleeremans and Willingham)
make the related proposal that consciousness varies on a
continuum. As training continues, initially unconscious
knowledge becomes increasingly conscious. Changes in
the degree of consciousness would account for observed
changes in the amount of information reported verbally as
well as for changes in prediction accuracy and even
reaction time. However, we prefer the interpretation that
the information represented in consciousness increases in
amount and in strength (i.e., certainty). Our argument,
via the Sensitivity Criterion, is that verbal report places a
high threshold of certainty and retrievability, whereas
other tests, such as the prediction task, place a lower
threshold. The lower threshold allows less certain infor-
mation to be demonstrated.
Besides quantitative differences, of course, the content
of verbal reports may vary qualitatively. As we discuss in
the target article, learning (and testing) protocols may
demonstrate heavy reliance on memorization and in-
stance learning or they may demonstrate heavy use of
reasoning and problem-solving skills and hypotheses.
Note that although we believe that verbal reports should
be treated with care, it is not the case (as Catania
suggests) that we have ruled out verbal reports as relevant
to judging a learner's awareness. They are certainly rele-
vant; they may just not be exhaustive.
R2.5. Do prediction and recognition tasks measure con-
scious or unconscious knowledge? Several commenta-
tors (Cleeremans, Dienes & Perner, Rakover, Seger)
raise the issue, addressed at some length in the target
article, that prediction and recognition tests may not be
"process-pure," that is, they may not pr6vide pure indices
of conscious knowledge but may be contaminated by
unconscious knowledge. We reiterate that we believe this
is a perfectly valid objection which will only be resolved
by further investigation. At present we probably do not
have sufficient information to resolve the issue.
Dienes & Perner criticise prediction and recognition
tests, because such tests do not require subjects to de-
scribe the underlying basis of their responses: a subject
may make a correct prediction without being able to
justify that prediction. But this would only be relevant if
we thought that justification played a role in the perfor-
mance measure (e.g., RT). That is, if subjects only re-
sponded quickly in the RT phase when they could de-
scribe the basis of their expectation about where the next
signal would appear, then to meet the Information Crite-
rion, the awareness test would have to pick out only those
cases where justification was available. But in general we
have no reason to believe that justifications play a role in
performance tasks, in which case Dienes & Perner's
position has little direct support.
R2.6. The possible causal role of awareness. We made no
inferences concerning the possible causal role of aware-
ness. Our aim was merely to show that, as an empirical
fact, awareness is necessary for learning. Some commen-
tators (Catania, Poldrack & Cohen) wonder about the
specific role that consciousness plays in learning. The
view that awareness is necessary for learning could entail
a range of possibilities, with a causal role merely repre-
senting one extreme. At the other extreme, awareness
may have no causal role with respect to learning but may
be correlated with it via a third factor.
Far from being tangential to the question of implicit
learning, (as Svartdal claims) the correlation between
level of performance and verbal report demonstrates the
coupling between performance and consciousness. We
have no particular reason for favoring one interpretation
of the role of consciousness over any other. We note,
however, that subjects may consciously choose a learning
strategy, such as hypothesis testing or memorization, and
that this choice affects learning. In this sense, at least,
consciousness affects what is learned.
Squire et al. claim that in cases where the two are
correlated, consciousness is epiphenomenal to learning.
Thus, despite the fact that conditioning cannot be shown
to occur in the absence of awareness, the latter plays no
causal role and is merely a nonfunctional "shadow" that
accompanies learning. But, as Lovibond (1993) argues
eloquently, the correlation between conscious knowledge
and learning is incredibly close. The epiphenomenalist
position therefore looks decidedly strange, because if
consciousness is an epiphenomenon, it ought to be pos-
sible to dissociate it from learning. There is no evidence
that this is possible, however. (We argue below that
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amnesia does not represent a case in which awareness and
learning are uncoupled.)
R3. Further evidence for implicit learning
Inevitably, commentators have cited studies that we
failed to cover in the target article. We apologise if, by
wittingly or unwittingly excluding certain pieces of evi-
dence, we have reached erroneous conclusions.
Some commentators take us to task for considering
such a limited and artificial range of learning tasks and for
drawing more general conclusions about human learning
than is warranted by these studies. To an extent, we
cannot help but agree, but we also believe that complex
real-world learning is largely reducible to simpler learn-
ing. By considering such basic learning paradigms as
Pavlovian conditioning, we therefore hope to encompass
more complicated and realistic learning situations. Be-
sides, we know of no careful studies of the contents of
people's consciousness when they are learning to play
tennis (see Overskeid).
R3.1. The mere exposure effect. Bornstein maintains that
data from experiments on the mere exposure effect pro-
vide compelling evidence for unconscious learning. In
such experiments (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980),
subjects show an increased preference for stimuli which
have been repeatedly exposed for brief durations, but
they cannot recognise those stimuli. We have no dispute
over the robustness of such effects, but we do have strong
reservations about whether they demonstrate implicit
learning.
It is odd that Bornstein persistently refers to these
experiments as involving stimuli perceived without
awareness, because the evidence that the stimuli in most
of these experiments are subliminal is very weak. For
example, they are often presented unmasked, and a
forced-choice present/absent test is rarely included (see
Bornstein et al., 1987, for an exception). This is impor-
tant, because if the original stimuli were genuinely sub-
liminal, then any preference for them at test would have
to represent a role for unconscious information.
Be that as it may, dissociations clearly do emerge
between subsequent preference and recognition judg-
ments, whether the stimuli were consciously perceived at
study or not, and this finding may also provide evidence
(albeit less direct) of unconscious processes. In this case,
the idea would simply be that there is a source of informa-
tion available for making the preference but not the
recognition judgment, and this information may there-
fore be the end-product of an unconscious learning sys-
tem operating in tandem with the conscious system.
However, we pointed out that hypermnesia seems to
occur for recognition responses in these experiments
(Merikle & Reingold 1991), and we cited this as evidence
that in making recognition judgments, subjects may ini-
tially discount a source of conscious information such as
perceptual fluency (Brody & Crowley propose a similar
account in their commentary). Bornstein does not provide
an alternative explanation of the hypermnesia finding.
Moreover, it turns out that some very recent evidence
supports our position and directly refutes the view that
the preference and recognition judgments are based on
different sources of information. Whittlesea (1993) has
shown that the dissociation of affect and recognition can
occur even for items that did not appear in the study
phase. In his experiment, he required subjects to rate
words for pleasantness and also to judge whether they had
been recently presented; in fact, the critical words had
not been preexposed. Because of a manipulation of the
context in which the words appeared, some words were
processed more fluently than others, and this led them to
be rated as pleasant, but these same words were not called
"old." Thus the dissociation of affect and recognition
occurs even for novel items.
This result directly contradicts the idea that above-
chance affect judgments are based on unconscious infor-
mation encoded during the study phase. Instead, as
Whittlesea argues, the result must be attributable to the
different ways in which information (such as perceptual
fluency) concerning a test item may be interpreted in
affect and recognition tests.
R3.2. Conditioning. Our conclusion that awareness is
necessary for conditioning is disputed by Kimmel, who
cites as positive evidence a study by G rings (1965) in
which subjects acquired autonomic CRs but "when ques-
tioned after three days of conditioning . . . revealed no
knowledge about stimulus relations." Kimmel also cites a
study (Kimmel et al. 1983) in which subjects could be
shown to have learned about one of two coloured lights
that signalled shocks but were unable to report whether it
was the blue or yellow light, and another study (Lachnit &
Kimmel 1993) in which subjects apparently learned to
respond appropriately to CSs even if they were unaware
of the relevant reinforcement contingencies.
Kimmel seems to think that such results are persuasive
since "the subjects . . . were questioned very closely,
and the questioners were motivated to detect any sign of
awareness. At the very least, Shanks & St. John should
describe what they consider inadequate in interview
procedures from studies claiming conditioning without
awareness, instead of rejecting them peremptorily or
acting as if they do not even exist." We did not dismiss
these studies peremptorily; rather, we consider them to
have exactly the same flaws as other studies that we did
cite. These flaws include using an awareness index that
fails to provide the subject with the same quality of
retrieval cues as the conditioning measure.
It does not matter how closely the subjects are ques-
tioned or how motivated the questioners were. If the
subjects' knowledge is fairly ephemeral, then any decre-
ment in the conditions of testing between the implicit and
explicit tests will lead to less information being revealed.
We leave it as an exercise for the reader to decide whether
results such as those Kimmel cites provide conclusive
evidence of unconscious learning. Incidentally, we have
been unable to evaluate the Lachnit and Kimmel (1993)
study that Kimmel cites, because that report does not in
fact include any discussion or data concerning aware
versus unaware subjects.
We do not believe we have given an unfair description
of Baeyens et al.'s data. When subjects are given a
concurrent test of awareness (rather than just a postex-
perimental questionnaire), more of them appear to be
aware of the conditioning contingencies. Is this because
the concurrent measure is more sensitive, or because it
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actually creates awareness? Baeyens et al.'s belief in
unconscious learning requires them to exclude the former
possibility, but we see no reason (and they provide no
evidence) for such a conclusion. There are any number of
reasons why a concurrent test might be more sensitive
than a post hoc one. For further criticism of the data on
evaluative conditioning, see Davey (1994).
R3.3. Instrumental learning. We applaud Svartdal's use of
an interesting alternative to the standard logic of dissocia-
tion to demonstrate unconscious instrumental learning.
Svartdal recommends providing explicit instructions that
focus the subject's attention on one aspect of responding
(e.g., position), but arranging for reinforcement to be
under the control of variations in another dimension of
responding (e.g., force). With such a procedure, Svartdal
(1992) showed that variations in the dimension of re-
sponding that was in fact reinforced became larger and
larger, apparently without the subjects being aware of this
change.
As Svartdal notes, though, such an experiment is still
likely to be dogged by the problem of correlated hypoth-
eses. He dismisses the claim that correlated hypotheses
may have been the basis of his subjects' responding,
because when asked to formulate advice to another hypo-
thetical person on how to master the task, subjects typ-
ically gave very general answers and failed to verbalise
any such correlated hypotheses. But until we know what
the putative correlated hypothesis might be, it is very
difficult to know what we should be looking for in these
protocols. If the hypothesis is only partially used, or if
several different correlated hypotheses are used concur-
rently or on different trials, or if the hypothesis is very
complex, subjects' inability to give useful verbal reports
would hardly be surprising. Because there can be no
doubt that correlated hypotheses play a crucial role in
many instrumental tasks (Dulany 1961), we reiterate our
conclusion that the existence of such hypotheses makes it
very unlikely that clear evidence of unconscious learning
will emerge from instrumental tasks.
Berry rightly points out that we should have discussed
the study by Stanley et al. (1989), which used the yoking
procedure that we commended in the target article.
However, we believe that this study provides far from
convincing support for implicit learning. In their first
three experiments, Stanley et al. observed that verbal
protocols from subjects who have had extensive practice
at a control task (sugar production or person interaction)
could significantly improve the performance of naive
subjects, indicating that a good deal of knowledge was
available to verbal report.
In Experiment 4, Stanley et al. (1989) selected a sample
(12 out of 53 subjects) of people learning the control task
who had a clear transition point where their performance
showed a marked and relatively sudden improvement.
Stanley et al. found that yoked subjects given the pretran-
sition verbal protocols from these subjects showed just as
much benefit as yoked subjects given the posttransition
protocols. From this Stanley et al. concluded that a sharp
performance increase is not immediately accompanied by
an increase in the quality of verbal report, because other-
wise the yoked subjects given posttransition transcripts
should have shown a much greater benefit than those
given the pretransition transcripts.
Although this result is certainly interesting, we believe
that there are at least two problems with Stanley et al.'s
interpretation. First, a statistical artifact may have been
introduced by the procedure of selecting subjects who
showed a sudden transition in performance. Naturally,
random variation accounts for some of the fluctuations in
performance in these tasks, but if it is merely chance that
is responsible for the selected subjects' transitions, then
there is no reason to expect their accompanying verbal
protocols to show any marked improvement after the
transition.
Second, Stanley et al. found in Experiment 3 that naive
subjects given a simple rule did not perform at the
maximum level achievable with that rule. Subjects were
told to "select the response level half-way between the
current production level and the target level," which if
followed could lead to 83% responses on target. However,
subjects achieved only 50% correct responses. The ob-
vious conclusion is that even when subjects have access to
a useful rule, they will not always use it. Perhaps they are
not confident that a rule is correct until they have tested it
by comparing what happens when they do and do not
follow it. But if that is the case, then there is no justifica-
tion for supposing that the yoked subjects in Experiment
4 should have shown an immediate improvement in per-
formance when given the posttransition protocols. In
sum, the yoked design Stanley et al. used is very promis-
ing (and without question shows that subjects may have
access to far more knowledge than would be predicted by
other forms of questioning), but it has not established that
any significant amount of knowledge is unconscious.
Rizzo & Parlangeli argue that in complex control tasks
where some real-world schema is available to the subject,
subjects will use that schema as a basis for rule learning.
They report that in some circumstances a subject will be
unable to learn to control a system formally identical to
one they can learn to control if the former retrieves
schema-based knowledge that is incompatible with the
contingencies of the task. Rizzo & Parlangeli suggest that
this is inconsistent with the existence of an independent
implicit learning system, because such a system would be
unaffected by the specific content of the task. We are not
sure that this line of reasoning is watertight, but it is
certainly interesting that such differences can emerge.
Rizzo & Parlangeli also report obtaining strong correla-
tions between performance and verbal report.
Overskeid claims that instrumental learning is possible
during sleep, but we see no good reasons to assume that
people are completely unaware when they are asleep. If it
is difficult, as Andrade suggests, to prove beyond doubt
that people are unconscious when they are anesthetized,
then it will surely be a good deal harder to prove it when
they are asleep. Moreover, numerous well-controlled
studies have failed to reveal any signs of learning during
sleep (British Psychological Society 1992; Wood et al.
1992)
R3.4. Sequence learning. Our interpretation of Stadler's
(1989) study is very nicely refuted by Stadler & Frensch.
We argued that the failure of the prediction test to reveal
any savings (although the RT data indicated that learning
had occurred) may have been due to interference and
hence rapid forgetting during the test, which provided no
feedback to maintain accurate performance. Our hypoth-
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esis was that evidence of savings may have been present
on the earlier test trials but abolished on later trials as
interference built up. Stadler & Frensch report that
prediction performance was at chance even from trial 1.
Because we have argued that this study goes a good way
toward meeting the Sensitivity and Information Criteria,
we are happy to acknowledge that the results appear to
provide good evidence of unconscious learning. Our only
outstanding concerns would be (1) that the assessment of
awareness was based on a fraction of the number of
observations that were used to demonstrate RT speed-up,
introducing possible problems of statistical power, and (2)
that we continue to believe that withholding feedback in
the prediction test works against the possibility of finding
significant savings. But because the awareness test pro-
vided no hint of savings, the former concern is probably
unimportant, and the latter concern can easily be avoided
by providing feedback and comparing prediction perfor-
mance with that of a control group trained on random
patterns. Stadler's (1989) study clearly merits replication
and further exploration to reveal why this experiment
obtained evidence of a dissociation between RT speed-up
and prediction performance whereas so many others,
reviewed in the target article, have failed to do so.
Reed & Johnson also report a new experiment that
seems to meet our criteria while still obtaining a dissocia-
tion between performance and awareness. In that experi-
ment, subjects trained on the repeating reaction time
sequence 12134231432 were then tested on the sequence
123413214243, which is matched in terms of single-event
and pairwise frequencies. The increase in response laten-
cies that Reed & Johnson (1994) observed must therefore
be attributable to genuine sequence learning, involving at
least knowledge of second-order structure. That this
knowledge was implicit is suggested by the fact that
performance on generation and recognition tests was at
chance. In the generation test, for example, subjects saw
sequences of 2 target locations from the training phase
and they then generated the 10 locations they thought
had followed the target sequence in the training phase.
Reed & Johnson found that subjects were no more likely
to make a correct first response following the 2 targets
than were control subjects trained on a random sequence.
The recognition test also revealed no evidence of explicit
sequence knowledge.
We are somewhat less convinced than with Stadler's
(1989) experiment that this provides compelling evidence
of unconscious learning. First, with a relatively small
number of trials per subject, the generation and recogni-
tion tests may not have been powerful enough to detect
small savings from the training phase. Second, it is not at
all clear why Perruchet and Amorim's (1992) subjects
were able to perform above chance in generation and
recognition tests whereas Reed & Johnson's were not. It
is true that there are several procedural differences be-
tween the tasks, but the discrepancy remains trouble-
some. Third, and most important, we have found in a
replication of Reed & Johnson's experiment that subjects
can perform well above chance in a generation test. We
trained subjects on the same sequence and under the
same conditions Reed & Johnson used, but we then
required the subjects to predict target locations in a
standard prediction test containing 96 trials, with feed-
back about correct target location. On the first cycle of 12
trials, subjects made reliably more correct predictions
(45.2%) than would be expected if they only had knowl-
edge of first-order structure (33.3%). Our subjects, there-
fore, did appear to have access on the generation test to
second-order sequence knowledge. Of course, firm con-
clusions must await additional data.
Cleeremans suggests that "there is no evidence what-
soever that subjects have conscious access to ... distri-
butional information about the stimulus material." We
disagree. Even if prediction performance is to some
extent contaminated by unconscious processes, the re-
sults (including those of Cleeremans & McClelland 1991,
but especially those of Perruchet & Amorirn 1992) suggest
that subjects have extensive conscious access to the rele-
vant distributional information. More important, there is
no evidence that they do not.
R3.5. Amnesia. Many of the commentators (Cleeremans,
Holyoak & Cattis, Kourtzi et al., Packard, Poldrack &
Cohen, Reber & Winter, Seger, Squire et al., Will-
ingham) were concerned by the lack of weight we gave to
data from memory-impaired patients. The argument for
the significance of such data is clearly stated by Poldrack
& Cohen. They claim that "it has been well documented
that amnesic patients can exhibit normal learning of
(motor, perceptual, and cognitive) skills, and can do so in
the absence of the ability to recollect the learning experi-
ences." If learned information can project itself onto
performance without being available to consciousness,
then surely we have prima facie evidence of implicit
learning.
We acknowledge that such results provide, at first
glance, an apparently strong case for an influence of
unconscious information. However, we believe that the
commentators have failed to give a fair or complete
picture of the data from patients with anterograde amne-
sia. We believe there are many places where their argu-
ment needs a substantial amount of extra work, and in the
present section we enumerate various reasons why amne-
sic data may be explained without appeal to implicit
learning.
As a preliminary consideration, it is important to note
that there are an enormous number of theories of amne-
sia, and how they bear on the issue of unconscious
learning varies. The view that what is impaired in amnesia
is the ability to have conscious declarative memory of
prior learning episodes is only one of many theories, and
it is by no means clear that this theory is correct (see
Mayes 1988). If amnesia in fact turns out to be a selective
deficit of contextual processing (Mayes 1988), orofconfig-
ural learning (Kourtzi et al.; Rudy & Sutherland 1992), or
of spatial learning (Hirst & Volpe 1984), or if it turns out to
be attributable to any of the huge number of other factors
that have been postulated, then its relevance to the issue
of unconscious learning will be very limited.
Another reason why data from amnesics may not pro-
vide additional illumination concerning implicit learning
is that the pattern of data seen in amnesics can readily be
obtained with normal subjects anyway. As mentioned in
the target article, memory-intact people can be induced
to perform at above-chance levels on indirect tests of
memory such as preference tests, while performing much
more poorly (and perhaps even at chance) on recognition
tests (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980). As explained in
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the target article and in section R3.1, we see little reason
to regard such results as evidence of unconscious learn-
ing. Poor recognition memory may occur simply because
subjects discount a source of conscious information. But
perhaps evidence from amnesia is more compelling?
It may be helpful to consider a specific example that is
typical of the behavior of amnesics. Knowlton et al. (1992)
trained normal and amnesic subjects in the typical man-
ner of an artificial grammar study, and found that they
performed at approximately equivalent levels in classify-
ing test strings as grammatical or nongrammatical (nor-
mals = 66.9% correct, amnesics = 63.2% correct). How-
ever, on a recognition test in which old grammatical and
new nongrammatical strings were presented, the amne-
sics (62.0% correct) performed significantly worse than
the normal subjects (72.2% correct). Thus, on the test of
conscious knowledge of which strings were study items,
the amnesics were impaired, but this had no significant
effect on their ability to use those items to guide
classification.
Cleeremans, Holyoak & Cattis, Kourtzi et al., Pack-
ard, Poldrack & Cohen, Reber & Winter, Seger, Squire
et al., and Willingham all believe that results such as this
provide evidence of implicit learning. Yet the logic of the
argument for this conclusion is rarely spelt out (though
see Reingold & Merikle 1988 for an excellent discussion).
Presumably, when fleshed out it would run in one of two
ways, depending on the exact outcome of the recognition
test:
1. If the amnesics are at chance on the recognition test
but perform above chance on the implicit classification
test, that means there is information that is available to
the implicit but not to the explicit test. Subjects will be
strongly motivated to use all available conscious informa-
tion when performing the explicit recognition test,
hence, the information that is projected onto the implicit
but not the explicit test must be unconscious. And if
that information is unconscious at the time of retrieval,
then it is plausible to assume that it was registered
unconsciously.
2. If the recognition test reveals above-chance perfor-
mance, then the argument is slightly more complex and
presumably runs as follows. In Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
experiment, for example, it is no longer possible to say
straightaway that the amnesics had access to a source of
information on the implicit test that was not available to
them on the explicit test, because recognition and classifi-
cation are measured in quite different ways. What we can
say is that the normal subjects have access to more
information on the recognition test than do the amnesics.
Because this information is assumed to be conscious, the
only way the normals and amnesics could perform equally
well on the implicit test is if the test is unaffected by
conscious information (because normal subjects have
more conscious information but they do not perform any
better). Therefore above-chanpe performance on the im-
plicit test must be attributable to unconscious informa-
tion, and the argument proceeds as before.
With respect to the sorts of implicit learning experi-
ments that have been conducted with amnesics, it is the
second of the above arguments that is relevant rather than
the first. In these experiments (e.g., Knowlton et al.
1992), explicit and implicit memory are assessed in quite
different ways using different response scales, and recog-
nition is typically above chance. We know of no clear cases
where identical measures are used (e.g., forced-choice
recognition versus classification), and in any case our
reservations about the mere exposure effect in normals
would apply equally to such cases.
Thus we must evaluate the second of the above argu-
ments. There are many places in which it could be
challenged, but for present purposes it is vital to note that
the line of reasoning only works if performance is truly
equivalent in the amnesics and normals on the implicit
test. If the normal subjects perform even only marginally
better on that test, the argument will not go through,
because it is possible that the extra conscious knowledge
the normal subjects have (as indexed by superior perfor-
mance on the explicit test) is what explains their superior
performance on the implicit test.
1 We would then be left
with no grounds for concluding that unconscious knowl-
edge is playing any role at all.
We will argue that the data do not in fact provide strong
support for the argument, because, contrary to what is
usually claimed, implicit tests of knowledge typically do
reveal impaired learning in amnesics (in situations where
their explicit knowledge is poor). It is simply not true that
amnesics perform normally on implicit learning tasks for
which their explicit memory is impaired: at most, what
can be said is that on some implicit tasks we do not know
for certain whether they are impaired or not, whereas on
others they are definitely impaired.
As the data cited above show, Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
amnesic subjects performed worse (albeit nonsignifi-
cantly) than their control subjects, and this is typical of
implicit learning studies with amnesics. For example,
Kolodny (1994) found that amnesics were worse than
normal subjects at learning to classify unfamiliar paint-
ings. Squire and Frambach (1990) found that although
amnesics were able to learn to control a complex task,
their performance was worse than that of normals. Knowl-
ton and Squire (1993) found that amnesics could correctly
categorize the unseen prototype pattern of random dot
stimuli, though at a numerically but nonsignificantly
lower level of accuracy than could normals. Nissen and
Bullemer (1987) observed that although amnesics could
improve their performance in a sequential reaction time
task, they learned less than normals, as indexed by the
fact that their RTs increased by a smaller amount when
they were transferred to a random sequence.
Similarly, Charness et al. (1988) found that amnesics
were impaired in learning patterns in the Hebb digits
task. Amnesics such as H. M. were impaired at learning
puzzles such as the Tower of Hanoi (Gabrieli et al. 1987).
Finally, despite repeated claims that conditioning occurs
at normal rates in amnesics, there is clear evidence of
impairments in conditional discrimination learning
(Daum et al. 1991) and simple operant conditioning
(Channon et al. 1993), if not in simple conditioning.
Note that we are not arguing that amnesics always show
impaired learning. Rather, we are claiming that in those
cases where their explicit memory for some information is
impaired, their implicit memory for that information will
be so as well. Thus the finding, cited by Squire et al., that
amnesics show normal speed-up in learning to read
mirror-reversed text is irrelevant unless it can be shown
that they have poorer explicit memory for the knowledge
responsible for their improved performance. That their
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memory for the content of the text they have read may be
poorer than that of normals is not sufficent to establish this
fact. Reading mirror-reversed text may be based on some-
thing totally unrelated to text memory, such as knowledge
of single mappings from reversed to normal letters.
Defenders of the view that amnesics show normal
implicit, but not explicit, learning would almost certainly
reply that, even granting the above cases, there are
numerous other implicit tasks, such as repetition prim-
ing, in which the performance of amnesics is unquestiona-
bly normal (although they have impaired explicit mem-
ory), and that these cases provide incontrovertible
evidence of implicit learning. For example, Squire et al.
assert that priming is intact in amnesia. Again we have to
disagree. The main problem is that amnesics almost
invariably perform at lower baseline levels than normals,
in which case it becomes very difficult to determine what
counts as "normal" learning. Numerous studies have
shown that, in absolute terms, the amount of repetition
priming observed in amnesics and normals is equivalent,
but Ostergaard (1994) pointed out that these amounts of
priming occur against a background of different overall
baselines. Because priming in normals is correlated with
baseline latency, and because amnesics have a slower
overall baseline, they need to show a larger absolute
priming effect to achieve the same relative effect as
normals. Amnesics show the same amount of priming in
absolute terms, however, despite their slower baseline;
hence, it follows that amnesics are impaired, not normal,
on these tasks.
Part of the difficulty here is that to claim that amnesics
learn normally in some tasks is to accept the null hypoth-
esis that a difference does not exist (e.g., Knowlton et al.'s
1992 experiment), but often it is questionable whether the
experiment had sufficient statistical power to reject the
null hypothesis. Of course, one simple way around the
problem would be to show that amnesics can perform
better than normals on some implicit task (e.g., as a result
of having been given more study trials or a shorter
retention interval), coupled with poorer explicit memory.
Our position seems to gain support from the fact that
there appear to be no published cases of this sort.
Granted, there are some studies in which amnesics have
been tested after a shorter retention interval than normals
such that performance on the implicit memory test is
equated, and where the amnesics still appear to show a
selective impairment of episodic memory (e.g., Schacter
et al. 1984), but these results have proven very difficult to
interpret, because the difference in performance on the
implicit and explicit tests may be a function of retention
interval (see Mayes 1992). A crossover interaction would
be much more persuasive.
We believe that impaired learning in amnesia, as in-
dexed by implicit tests, is the norm rather than the
exception. That being the case, the argument that amne-
sic data demonstrate implicit learning comes completely
unglued, because it is quite possible that the pattern of
impairment seen in amnesia can be interpreted in terms
of a single functional knowledge system: it is no longer
necessary to assume two distinct forms of knowledge
(conscious and unconscious) contributing to task
performance.
By analogy to Farah et al.'s (1993) model, we assume
that knowledge is represented in the weights of a parallel-
distributed memory system which can be probed both
implicitly and explicitly. When lesioned, such a system
would have sufficient knowledge to perform fairly well on
an implicit test that can benefit from small and fragmen-
tary amounts of knowledge, but the retained knowledge
may not be sufficient to allow for the complete trace
redintegration that is typically required in an explicit test.
This is tantamount to saying that the explicit tests used to
evaluate conscious knowledge in amnesics are generally
less sensitive to small amounts of residual information in
memory than the implicit tests used to measure
performance.
Whatever the merits of our argument, it may well be
objected that we have provided no direct evidence in
favor of it. We have therefore carried out some computer
simulations to try to reproduce Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
pattern of data in a single system. The first author, in
collaboration with N. Hursey, set up a standard back-
propagation network to classify strings as grammatical or
nongrammatical. The network was presented with gram-
matical and nongrammatical strings in the training phase
and learned to produce the correct classification decisions
across one set of output units. In addition to being taught
to classify the strings, the network was simultaneously
trained to reproduce the input string across a second set of
output units, as in an "encoder" network. After "lesioning"
(in fact involving the addition of random noise [mean =
0.0] to the weights) the network's classification and recog-
nition performance was evaluated. For recognition, we
measured the accuracy with which each input string was
reproduced across the relevant output units.
The critical result was that classification accuracy was
only mildly affected by the "lesion" but the network's
ability to recognize the training patterns correctly was
severely impaired, reproducing the exact pattern that
Knowlton et al. (1992) observed in their human subjects.
Such a result should not be surprising: it merely extends
to amnesia the results reported by Farah et al. (1993; see
sect. R2), and confirms the claim that recognition judg-
ments are less sensitive to partial information than are
grammaticality judgments. Our simulation also illustrates
why it is so important that amnesics are impaired, even if
only marginally, on implicit tests: it is because a connec-
tionist network would have great difficulty modelling a
case in which performance on only one type of test is
impaired.
On the hypothesis that there is a single source of
conscious information that is used on implicit and on
explicit tests, amnesics would be predicted to perform
worse on both; and this is exactly the pattern of results
that is observed. In sum, we believe that much of the data
from amnesic subjects performing implicit learning tasks
of the sort reviewed in the target article can be inter-
preted by means of a single functional system, with some
memory tests simply being more sensitive than others to
small amounts of fragmentary information in the system.
It is certainly possible that the behavior of amnesics is
relevant to the question of unconscious learning, but we
believe that advocates of that view will have to do a great
deal of work to establish it.
R3.6. Language learning. Language acquisition is fre-
quently cited as a prime example of unconscious rule
learning (e.g., see commentaries by Lachter, Nagata,
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Reber & Winter). Everything from spelling to grammar
appears to be rule governed, and even though native
speakers perform well on implicit tests of linguistic knowl-
edge (e.g., grammaticality judgments), they are rarely
able to report the relevant rules. Such a result is evidence
for implicit learning provided the Information Criterion is
met: as long as the rules identified by linguists are indeed
the basis of peoples' implicit linguistic competence, their
inability to report them suggests that the rules are repre-
sented in an unconscious form.
A number of researchers, however, have begun to
challenge the idea that linguistic knowledge is rule based;
they have shown instead that aspects of language may be
learned by distributed instance memory. For example,
Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) and Plunkett and
Marchman (1991) describe connectionist networks that
can learn to perform the mapping of English verbs from
their root forms to their past tense forms. Sejnowski and
Rosenberg (1987) and Seidenberg and McClelland (1989)
constructed networks that learn to transform written
words into spoken words, and Elman (1990) and St. John
and McClelland (1990) showed that networks can learn
simple aspects of English grammar and semantics (these
are representative examples among a host of others). All of
these network models learn by repeated exposure to
instances. Over time, regularities in the data are in-
corporated into the weights. This instance-based learn-
ing procedure is the same procedure that was used
by Dienes (1992) to model artificial grammar learning and
by Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) to model serial
reaction-time learning.
Lachter questions what children could be aware of that
would allow them to make grammaticality judgments
about intricately structured sentences. One might ask
whether there are any distributed processing network
models, such as those described in the target article, that
can perform sophisticated grammaticality judgments.
The current answer is no, but some network models are
beginning to approach this level of sophisticated sentence
processing. Elman (1993) described a network that accu-
rately processes center-embedded sentences, and St.
John (1994) found that a network can accurately process
sentences with subject- or object-relative clauses. These
networks could be modified to produce actual gram-
maticality judgments for artificial language strings.
Are these models focusing on the important structural
organization of the languages on which they are trained?
In analyses of the hidden unit representations that these
networks develop, Elman (1993) has found evidence that
they learn aspects of the phrase structure of the language.
Given that these networks are developing a sensitivity to
linguistic structure, the possibility that future distributed
instance/memorization models will attain a sophisticated
level of processing and be capable of making gram-
maticality judgments appears quite promising.
The research into network models of language learning
is controversial and far from complete. For example,
Pinker (1991) and Lachter and Bever (1988) argue that the
detailed phenomena of the regular verb past tense re-
quire a rule system (see Goldstone & Kruschke's com-
mentary). What we can conclude is that it has not been
shown beyond doubt that linguistic knowledge is in the
form of rules. That being the case, peoples' inability to
articulate such rules is neither here nor there. Time, and
further research, will tell what informational processes
underlie children's linguistic behavior and how far net-
work models can be taken to model aspects of language
learning without appealing to unconscious rule-learning
systems.
R4. How should implicit learning be
characterized?
Which dimensions make for sensible distinctions be-
tween learning systems? A common answer has been to
use the dimension of consciousness, but we have not
found a distinction between conscious and unconscious
learning to be warranted. We also discussed in section
R2.4 of this response the possibility that a distinction
between verbally reportable and unreportable knowl-
edge violates the Sensitivity and Information Criteria.
Instead, we propose that the distinction between verbally
reportable and unreportable knowledge is a useful,
though fallible, indicator of a real distinction between
rule learning and instance learning.
Several authors take issue with the rule/instance dis-
tinction or offer alternative ones. Nagata suggests that
our view of what is learned in artificial grammar experi-
ments does not differ markedly from Reber's. Whether or
not this is the case, the distinction between rules and
instances remains a valid one. Just because artificial
grammar experiments may not distinguish between rule
and instance learning, it does not follow that other experi-
ments, such as that of Regehr and Brooks (1993), do not.
Holyoak & Gattis suggest the additional criterion of
poor transferability and flexibility that, together with
instance-based knowledge and limited reportability,
seem to characterise what goes by the name "implicit
learning." This matrix of characteristics seems to fit with
and elaborate on the fragment/instance memorization
system. Somewhat similarly, Kourtzi et al. propose a
distinction between learning that depends on stimulus
recoding and learning of stimulus-response associations.
Direct S-R learning is assumed to be less flexible than
stimulus recoding. We are not sure whether these two
kinds of learning are meant to look different in on-line
protocols or are meant to be subject to different indepen-
dent variables, but in general we welcome the further
exploration of these alternative/additional distinctions
and their comparison to the instance memoriza-
tion/hypothesis testing distinction we proposed.
Merikle says that the attempt to (dis)prove any given
dissociation is doomed; simple dichotomies never seem to
get settled (cf., Newell's 1973 "You can't play 20 questions
with nature and win"). We feel that this position is too
strong, because researchers have gathered a huge amount
of data and learned a great deal about human learning
systems from considering simple dichotomies.
R4.1. Consciousness and models of implicit learning.
Our speculations about how to model awareness in a PDP
model are criticised by Cleeremans because such models
are not aware of the abstraction process across items.
Thus, assuming that the abstraction process in humans is
analogous to the learning processes in a PDP network,
this would appear to constitute a straightforward case of
learning without awareness. To be absolutely clear, we are
not proposing that networks are conscious. Rather, we are
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consciousness.
We agree wholeheartedly with Johnson-Laird's (1983,
p. 449) point that "like the weather, [consciousness] is
explicable by theories that can be simulated by computer
programs, but it can no more be embodied within a
computer than can an actual anti-cyclone: only organisms
with brains can be conscious." For reasons that no one
understands, some of the operations of the parallel net-
work that is the brain happen to be accompanied by
awareness of the content of what is being processed. We
suggest that artificial networks are capable of modelling,
albeit in a rudimentary way, the computational processes
of the brain, but that these processes are only accom-
panied by consciousness in real brains. Nonetheless, we
can quite happily hypothesise that it is a certain type of
processing operation (in brains or artificial networks) that
correlates with conscious experience.
We strongly disagree with Cleeremans's assertion that
"the very fact that obviously nonconscious and elemen-
tary networks are able to account for human perfor-
mance . . . has always struck me as evidence that aware-
ness is in fact ancillary in these tasks." It would be bizarre
to conclude that because a computer can simulate the
flight of a spaceship, therefore rocket fuel is unnecessary
for reaching the moon. For human learning, awareness
may be as necessary as rocket fuel is for space travel.
R4.2. The fragment/instance memorizer. We agree with a
number of commentators that rather than arguing about
consciousness, we ought to examine and characterise the
real differences between implicit and explicit learning. It
was in this spirit that we took up the question of what is
truly going on in implicit learning, namely, instance and
fragment memorization.
We believe that the available data are best explained in
terms of learning rules versus instances, and we are
impressed by the data Marsolek cites in favour of distinct
anatomical correlates of instance and rule learning. The
next big question is, what does the instance/fragment
memorization strategy look like, and how does it differ
from the rule-learning strategy? Cleeremans says we
need a process model, and we agree. But we feel that a
step along the way toward that goal is to examine the sorts
of information this system uses: what are instances and
fragments, and is this information sufficient to model
subjects' levels of performance? We reported several
studies (Cleeremans & McClelland 1991; Dienes 1992;
Perruchet & Pacteau 1990; Reber & Allen 1978; Servan-
Schreiber & Anderson 1990) that address this question.
Still, many commentators wonder what is learned in
implicit learning. What is this instance/fragment informa-
tion like? Is it an explicitly represented list of instances, or
is the representation less explicit, less individualised?
And how is it acquired? We have suggested that knowl-
edge of instances or fragments is represented across a
large number of weights in a parallel processor. This
distributed processor system is well characterized by
Dienes's and Cleeremans & McClelland's connectionist
models - as we point out in the target article. Still, it
seems from Cleeremans's comments as well as those of
others (Seger, Perruchet & Gallego) that we need further
exploration of how these distributed processors work and
how we can characterise their knowledge.
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Whether or not subjects are aware of the abstraction
process, they are plainly aware of the resulting knowledge
of fragments and fragment frequencies (Perruchet & Pao-
teau 1990; Reber & Allen 1978), and likely continuations
of strings and sequences (Dienes et al. 1991; Dulany etal.
1984). This information is available and even reportable at
test time.
If we accept the equation of consciousness with activa-
tion, then subjects can be aware of the level of activation
due to different frequencies and variabilities of fragments
during training. More frequent fragments will be en-
coded more often, their weights will grow stronger and
produce higher activation levels. As a result, these frag-
ments will seem familiar, both during training and at test
time. When new letters violate a common fragment or a
light violates a common sequence, the subject may "feel"
the violation as a mismatch between past predictions and
current encodings via a general reduction in the activa-
tion of the network. Either way, the activations of the
network provide information that the subject may report
as knowledge of the items. With learning, the weights
increase and therefore the activations increase. Should
we call this change an increase in awareness or an increase
in certainty of knowledge? We think the overwhelming
evidence falls on the side of interpreting this increase as a
change in certainty and quantity of knowledge.
We agree with Cleeremans that it is hard to imagine
how knowledge encoded in these weights could be in-
spected directly. But, as we tried to point out above, we do
not think direct inspection is necessary for the informa-
tion in the weights to be consciously available.
Such knowledge does not require an explicit and indi-
viduated encoding of each stimulus. Rather, we point to
Cleeremans's commentary as a good description of how a
distributed processor acquires the statistical regularities
of a corpus of stimuli and encodes that information in a
distributed format. Contrary to Kimmel's and Seger's
comments, distributed processors can perform a good
deal of abstraction from a corpus of instances. Maybe the
term "instance memorization" is not really adequate to
convey this automatic form of statistical abstraction. Per-
haps "distributed instance/fragment encoder" would bet-
ter designate the process we wish to consider.
R4.3. The relationship between memorization and rule
induction. A claim is made by Reber & Winter that our
account fails to come to grips with the requirement that
the memorial representation acquired in an artificial
grammar learning experiment must be of a form that
permits generalization and transfer to novel stimulus
items with different physical instantiations. We do not
disagree about the facts; even though we argued in the
target article that much of the data from such studies can
be understood simply in terms of instance or fragment
memory, we did conclude in sections R2.5.3and R3.2 that
transfer to novel items with different physical instantia-
tions is indeed possible (e.g., Altmann et al., in press).
However, contrary to what Reber & Winter argue, we
maintain that this presents no great difficulty for our
conception of implicit learning. In addition to memoriz-
ing fragments and instances of the study strings, subjects
also engage in a certain amount of hypothesis testing,
from which they induce abstract rules such as: "the first
two symbols of a string cannot be the same." Such rules
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allow them to perform slightly better than chance on a
grammaticality test with entirely different items such as
melodies. However, when tested on items in the same
format as the training items, both the induced rules and
the memorized fragments can contribute to the gram-
maticality judgement process, and hence performance is
better than in the changed-format condition.
Packard suggests that the notion of a "rule" is not useful
for characterizing types of learning, because a rule is
merely a guide or principle and "almost any task can be
construed to involve rule learning." Of course, as with the
terms "learning" and "consciousness," a great deal of
ambiguity is possible concerning what one means by the
term "rule," but we had a specific concept in mind in the
target article. A subject is responding on the basis of a rule
if performance to test items is uninfluenced by similarity
(e.g., to particular training items). Studies such as that of
Nosofsky et al. (1989) illustrate how formal rule models
can be constructed and how predictions based on instance
memorization and rule use can differ at the quantitative
level.
The relationship between distributed instance models
that can perform some abstraction on the one hand and
rule-learning systems on the other is a complex one.
Goldstone & Kruschke and Howe & Rabinowitz question
whether it is possible, given our present state of knowl-
edge, to conclude that memorization and rule induction
reflect the operations of distinct systems. We agree that
conclusions should be tentative. We also agree with Gold-
stone & Kruschke, Nagata, and Poldrack & Cohen that
there is enormous debate over what is an instance, what is
a rule, the extent to which they interact, and what
constitutes a model of either. But we doubt that memoriz-
ation and rule induction can be seen as the endpoints of a
continuum. Similarity either has a detectable effect or it
does not: this is not a continuum.
Our concern is to explain the differences in learning
and test behavior in experiments such as that of Reber et
al. (1980) where explicitly instructed subjects performed
quite differently from observation instructed subjects.
Though we are not aware of any studies in which on-line
protocols were taken from subjects in these conditions,
our prediction is that the two groups of subjects would
look radically different. A hypothesis-testing strategy is
quite different from the distributed encoding of instances.
It looks different in on-line protocols, as judged from
studies of hypothesis testing (Bruner et al. 1956; Klahr et
al. 1990), and a different set of variables affect behaviour
(Mathews et al. 1989; Reber et al. 1980).
For example, Reber et al. (1980) found that the order of
presentation of the stimuli only affected test performance
for the verbally instructed subjects. Of course, as Gold-
stone & Kruschke might agree, it is likely that even these
verbally instructed subjects, who were presumably fol-
lowing a hypothesis-testing strategy, would show some
influences of particular instances in their behavior, but we
would argue that these result from the influence of a
separate instance-encoding system.
Some commentators (Goldstone & Kruschke, Poldrack
& Cohen) cited Barsalou's (1990) claim to the effect that
abstraction and exemplar theories are logically indis-
tinguishable as evidence of the difficulty of maintaining a
contrast between inducing rules and memorizing exam-
ples. But although Barsalou's argument is interesting, his
conception of an abstraction is very different from our
notion of a rule, so we believe the relevance of his
argument is limited. For Barsalou, an abstraction is a
representation in which property information is central-
ised. For us, a rule does not encode information about
studied exemplars at all, but rather is a generalisation
about regularities in the exemplars.
To conclude, then, we agree that distributed instance
models produce a significant amount of abstraction and
therefore blur into what we think of as rules and rule-
formation models. However, there is strong evidence for
a very different strategy of hypothesis testing that looks
quite different from memorization.
We fully agree with the commentators who argue that
future research should take the direction of finding the
differences (and mechanisms) that distinguish implicit
from explicit learning. We think one profitable avenue
will be to investigate the sorts of factors that will differen-
tially influence a strategy of learning instances from one of
testing hypotheses.
NOTES
1. Nagata and Reber & Winter seem to believe that if only a
"small" amount of explicit knowledge is available, whereas a
"large" amount of implicit knowledge can be shown, then im-
plicit learning has been satisfactorily demonstrated. With re-
spect to amnesia, these commentators would presumably argue
that the small benefit the normal subjects show over amnesics in
the implicit test cannot explain the large discrepancy on the
explicit test, in which case argument 2 is still viable. Because the
normal subjects have far more explicit knowledge than the
amnesics, it follows that if the two tests relied on a common
source of knowledge, the normals would have to perform consid-
erably better than the amnesics on the implicit test. But their
excess explicit knowledge is unable to boost performance very
much on the implicit test. Hence the latter is principally
sensitive to unconscious information. We believe this view may
be quite widely held, but it is very important to emphasize that
it is entirely fallacious. The problem is that a difference of x%
correct on an implicit measure is as comparable with a difference
of (/% correct on an explicit measure as are apples with oranges.
Just because we may use a similar measure (e.g., percent
correct) in each case does not mean that they can be directly
compared, because the tests will differ in all sorts of other ways.
For example, the chance level of performance is often different
in the two tests. It is in general not possible to translate a
difference on a given response measure into information, and
hence inferences cannot be drawn about whether a subject has
"more" or "less" explicit than implicit knowledge. For the same
reason, Reber & Winter's claim that implicit learning is less
affected than explicit memory by such factors as individual
differences and IQ is completely unproven. In the Reber et al.
(1991) study, for example, IQ correlated less well with perfor-
mance on an implicit grammaticality judgment task than with
performance on a quite different series continuation task as-
sumed to require explicit processing. But there is no reason to
believe that the response scales for these two tasks are compara-
ble or that the difference between them is attributable to the
implicit-explicit dimension.
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